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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy often collides with other values,1 forcing the law to adopt 
strategies to manage the tradeoff. This essay explores those strategies. 
In it, I have three goals. 
First, I distinguish between two mutually-exclusive ways of 
managing the tradeoff between privacy and other values: “case-by-
case balancing,” which asks whether, all things considered, a 
particular violation of privacy is justified by countervailing benefits, 





1 Law enforcement and national security are the most obvious examples and will be the 
focus here. Others include: scientific research (especially in medicine); commercial 
innovation, see, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, Privacy Problems with Driverless Cars, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/self-
driving-car-makers-on-privacy-just-trust-us/474903/ [https://perma.cc/75UK-LVZC]; 
and certain forms of social accountability that involve the publication of otherwise private 
information, like journalism. In fact, it turns out that privacy even trades off against itself. 
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permission to violate privacy has met a generally-applicable burden, 
like probable cause. Second, I show that Helen Nissenbaum’s 
“contextual integrity” framework,2 the basis of her and Paula Kift’s 
luminous analysis in Metadata in Context,3 is an example of the 
former. Third, I defend the categorical approach on normative 
grounds, and thereby cast doubt on the utility of contextual integrity 
analysis for surveillance law. There is great wisdom, I argue, in 
preventing courts (and law enforcement authorities) from indulging in 
case-specific cost-benefit analyses, and instead tethering privacy law 
to stable ex ante benchmarks.   
II.  CASE-BY-CASE BALANCING V. CATEGORICAL RULES 
When gains in one dimension cause losses in another,4 one 
strategy for managing the tradeoff is to ask whether the gains 
outweigh the losses in a particular case. Another strategy is to fashion 
categorical decision-rules by which to resolve particular cases without 
recourse to a case-specific analysis of gains and losses. Such decision-
rules can certainly be informed by cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) — 
indeed, it would be odd if CBA did not play some role in the 
formulation of decision-rules — but once the rules are set, they have a 
preemptive effect on CBA, case-by-case. 
Existing constitutional and statutory rules regulating state 
surveillance exemplify the categorical approach. To determine the 
legality of a given search (or seizure), the question is not whether the 
search’s benefits outweigh its costs. The question is whether law 
enforcement satisfied a specific evidentiary burden before it carried 





2 For background, see HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2010).  
3 Paula Kift & Helen Nissenbaum, Metadata in Context: An Ontological and Normative 
Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program, 13 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 333 (2017).  
4 For simplicity’s sake, I am using “two dimensions” as shorthand; the same analysis would 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to multi-variant normative problems.  
5 To be sure, not all searches require probable cause. But the differences between probable 
cause and other evidentiary burdens, such as reasonable suspicion, exigency, or relevance, 
are immaterial to my analysis. The point is that all evidentiary burdens are “categorical,” in 
the sense that I am using the term. For helpful background, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
PRIVACY AT RISK 21-49 (2007). Probable cause thus operates a synecdoche for the 
categorical approach writ large.   
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to satisfy that burden, the search or seizure is unlawful.6 Period. In 
other words, if the police (say) enter a private home without probable 
cause, we prohibit the government from arguing that the benefits of 
entering the home were great enough, in this particular instance, to 
justify overriding the general rule. Whether we are wise to prohibit 
this style of argument is the focus of Part III. For now, the point is 
simply to appreciate that the prohibition exists, and more to the point, 
that the reason behind the prohibition is not that the premise of the 
government’s argument (i.e., that the benefits of intrusion can 
outweigh the costs of intrusion in a particular case) is wrong. Rather, 
the reason for the prohibition is that even assuming the government’s 
premise is right, we have decided that it will not carry the day; indeed, 
that it is irrelevant to the legal analysis.  
III.  KIFT AND NISSENBAUM’S ANALYSIS 
With that in mind, what should we make of Kift and Nissenbaum’s 
claim that bulk metadata collection — such as that carried out by the 
NSA, largely in secret, under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act after 
9/11 — offends privacy under a contextual integrity (“CI”) analysis? 
Surely they are right about the offense. It would be difficult to argue 
with a straight face that bulk data collection programs, “meta” or 
otherwise, raise no privacy concerns.7 Indeed, one of richest parts of 
their article is how it unearths the precarious, perhaps even 
incoherent, foundation of the supposed distinction between “data” 
and “metadata.” For this accomplishment alone, the article will stand 
as a lasting contribution.  
The natural next question, however, is whether (and in what 
sense) Kift and Nissenbaum’s analysis can help reform the legal rules 
that constrain state surveillance. On this front, I am skeptical. The CI 
framework, as Kift and Nissenbaum describe it, is a cost-benefit 
framework. Indeed, it is a highly refined one. The central insight of CI 





6 For analytic purposes, I am treating exceptions to a burden as part of the burden, insofar 
as exceptions operate as legal justifications. See Malcolm Thornbun, Justifications, Power, 
and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1103-07 (2008) (explaining that warrants operate as 
justifications, in the same manner as affirmative defenses in the criminal law). In other 
words, if the police can satisfy one of the exceptions to the probable cause requirement (for 
example), clearly their conduct is lawful. But that is just to say that they have met a 
different burden. It does not make the analysis any less categorical.  
7 Though government lawyers manage it surprisingly often.  
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the transmission is context-bound. In particular, expectations about 
the subsequent flow of information, which Kift and Nissenbaum call 
“transmission principles” — whether the information will be kept 
confidential, whether it will be transmitted to another party, and so 
forth — are defined entirely by context. This provides an easy and 
useful way of talking about privacy harms: a privacy harm results from 
the violation of transmission principles. If A transmits information to 
B and, because of contextual norms, A expects the information to be 
kept confidential, B’s decision to transmit the information to C will 
result in a privacy harm to A.  
So far, so good. But that is not where the CI analysis ends. When 
information flow violates a transmission principle (in the example, B’s 
transmission of information to C), “a prima facie case exists for 
claiming [a privacy harm].”8 But this “prima facie assessment” does 
not necessarily condemn the errant flow.9 Rather, the errant flow can 
be appropriate, notwithstanding the privacy harm it produces, if it 
better promotes the “values, goals and ends of a given context” than 
adherence to the transmission principle would have.10  
With regard to Section 215, for example, Kift and Nissenbaum 
make it quite clear that in their view, the bulk metadata collection 
program was (1) a violation of transmission principles (specifically, 
those governing information flow from users to telecom companies), 
and more importantly (2) an inappropriate violation of transmission 
principles. Ultimately, however, the driving force behind this 
conclusion is an empirical claim about the program’s efficacy. 
Although the metadata collection program clearly “constitute[d] a 
prima facie violation” of privacy, Kift and Nissenbaum concede that 
“theoretically,” the program could “still be justified” under contextual 
integrity principles if it “ultimately better achieve[d] the goal of 
national security, namely the prevention of future terrorist attacks.”11 
The problem, they argue, is that the program did not actually do this, 





8 Kift & Nissenbaum, supra note 3, at 16. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 29. 
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metadata collection program contributed to thwarting over 50 
different terrorist attacks.”12 
I take no sides in this empirical dispute. My point is simply that 
Kift and Nissenbaum admit, as they must, that privacy collides with 
other values — in the case of Section 215, national security — and the 
strategy they adopt for managing that tradeoff, hewing to CI 
principles, is to ask, in the context of a particular information flow, 
how the privacy harm measures up against countervailing benefits. As 
a matter of normative theory, this approach seems quite sensible. The 
question is whether it can hope to inform the regulation of state 
surveillance.  
Regrettably, I think not. In this area, decision-rules are 
categorical; paradigmatically, searches and seizures must be based on 
probable cause.13 If metadata collection qualifies as a search, as Kift 
and Nissenbaum suggest (joining a chorus of other scholars in the 
process),14 probable cause, or something like it, should be required to 
justify specific instances of collection. Arguments about the national 
security outcomes enabled by collection, notwithstanding the absence 
of probable cause, should not prevail. In fact, they should not even get 
off the ground. For the same reason that, if the police barge into a 
private home without probable cause, the government would get no 
mileage by pointing to the search’s salutary consequences, so the 
government should get no mileage by pointing to the salutary 
consequences of specific instances of metadata collection.  
Naturally, this does not mean the (in some cases considerable) 
benefits of state surveillance have no role to play in legal analysis. It 
means, rather, that their role is to help set categorical decision-rules, 
not to override those rules case-by-case. In other words, if particular 
surveillance practices such as metadata collection carry enormous 






13 Sometimes, decision rules have multiple components. For example, to enter a home 
under the Fourth Amendment’s exigency exception to warrant requirement, law 
enforcement must be able to show exigency and probable cause. See, e.g., Kentucky v. 
King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (discussing the exigency rule). Needless to say, the 
multiplication of categorical rules does not make the resulting composite rule any less 
categorical.   
14 The literature along these lines is voluminous. For a particularly useful and 
comprehensive take, see Laura Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and 
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014).  
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This could be achieved, for example, by relaxing the standard that 
state officials must satisfy as a precondition of surveillance authority.15  
But there are two important caveats here. First, the fact that a 
surveillance practice serves worthy goals is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for relaxing the state’s evidentiary burden. The other side of 
the coin is intrusiveness. Suppose we had good evidence suggesting 
that if police cameras were running 24 hours a day in every home 
across the United States, it would wipe out 99% of violent crime. Even 
so, I suspect that very few of us would entertain the idea of permitting 
such a program. Efficacy aside, the privacy costs are simply too high. 
We would still demand probable cause. 
Second, even if the goals advanced by surveillance (balanced 
against its intrusiveness) justify imposing a lesser evidentiary burden 
on the state, the resulting burden would still operate categorically. 
There is still no room, in other words, for case-specific override. This 
makes it difficult to see how Kift and Nissenbaum’s consequentialist 
gambit — the argument that information flows, even if they violate 
transmission principles, can nonetheless “be justified” if they 
“promote[] the values, goals and ends of a given context” — translates 
into law. Traditionally, the rules governing state surveillance do not 
focus on global justifiability; they focus instead on the satisfaction of 
specific evidentiary burdens. Some information flows qualify as 
searches, and are therefore subject to the probable cause requirement, 
regardless of how well or poorly they “promote the values, goals [or] 
ends” of the context in which they occur. The hypothetical from a 
moment ago — the stationing of police cameras inside private homes 
— is an example. Likewise, to my mind, is bulk metadata collection.  
IV.  THE WISDOM OF CATEGORICAL (PRIVACY) RULES 
Traditions, of course, are not normative arguments. In response to 
the categorical approach just described, one could easily argue that 
privacy law ought to abide by case-by-case balancing — that privacy 
law’s faith in categorical decision-rules is misplaced — especially when 
the interests on the other side, such as thwarting terrorism, are of 





15 This could happen in a variety of ways. For example, downgrading the evidentiary 
burden from “probable cause” to “reasonable suspicion,” or even replacing suspicion with 
an adequately-enforced “relevance” requirement (including, e.g., provisions to protect 
against abusive or pretextual searches).  
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This Part offers a brief defense of categorical privacy rules. In 
broad strokes, I argue that categorical rules draw strength from three 
principles. The first concerns the nature of case-by-case adjudication: 
there are limits to the CBA that we can expect police officers and 
judges to perform. The second principle concerns the nature of 
privacy harms, which often seem minimal in the context of particular 
cases, but become recognizably significant in the aggregate. This 
principle counsels in favor, I argue, of addressing fact-patterns by 
category rather than in isolation. And last but not least, the third 
principle concerns the value of predictable legal rules.  
A. The Practical Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis  
The first tick in favor of categorical privacy rules is the difficulty 
that would arise from actually doing CBA case-by-case. To enrich a 
hypothetical from earlier, suppose the police barge into a private 
residence, concededly without probable cause, and once inside they 
find a missing child (“Billy”) whom they have been pursuing for the 
last two days. When the search is challenged, Lt. Smith, the 
supervising officer, offers the following explanation: “I had a strong 
hunch that Billy was in the house. We did not have enough for a 
warrant, but I just got the sense that something was wrong. So I 
decided to go in. I know the standard is probable cause — and beyond 
that, a warrant. But I thought a departure was justified under the 
circumstances, given the high stakes.”  
Under CBA, this argument may win the day, or it may not. We 
would need many more facts — a full picture of the totality of 
circumstances — to evaluate it thoroughly. Even in the abstract, 
however, it is easy see how vexing it will be to fashion evaluative 
criteria. The question at first appears straightforward: why not just 
balance the benefit associated with the finding the lost child against 
the cost to the homeowner’s privacy? But on reflection, its complexity 
quickly multiplies.  
The complexity has many facets, but I would worry, specifically, 
about two. First, we would need to determine the scope of relevant 
costs. Should the measure of costs in this particular case include, for 
example, the likelihood that if Lt. Smith’s justification is accepted, the 
police will be marginally more likely to flout the probable cause and 
warrant requirements in the next case? If this cost is relevant — and I 
see no plausible argument why it would not be — a full interrogation 
of that question (an entire trial?) would be necessary to perform 
coherent CBA as to the specific intrusion. Second, we would need to 
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ask whether adherence to the categorical rule in fact would not have 
secured the relevant benefit. In other words, if the police had (1) 
performed further investigation, (2) drudged up facts sufficient to 
yield probable cause to search the house where Billy was found, and 
(3) secured a warrant, would they still have found Billy? This question 
is hard to answer. In fact, it is hard to know where to begin. The 
problem is similar to that of “harmless error” analysis in the due 
process context. Questions that turn on counterfactual imagination, 
requiring one to explore the infinitude of things that might have 
happened, as opposed to what actually happened, pose inherent 
epistemic difficulties. 
These issues could certainly be explored further; philosophers 
have been writing about them for centuries. But I trust the point is 
clear. Whether because we do not trust judges or police officers to 
perform the foregoing interpretive tasks correctly, or simply because 
we think the costs of performing them are simply too high to bear, we 
wisely dispense with case-specific inquiry. Who, after all, would favor 
a standard for authorizing police intrusion that requires a full analysis 
of systemic effects in each case? 
B. Harm-Aggregation  
The second tick in favor of categorical privacy rules is that they 
facilitate the aggregation of privacy injuries, which is often necessary 
to grasp the full extent of harm. Even bracketing the conceptual 
difficulties of case-by-case analysis, in particular cases (like poor 
Billy’s) there is often an imbalance between privacy harms, on one 
hand, and countervailing benefits, on the other, leading to a serious 
potential for distortive effects.  
Take the hypothetical explored above. Lt. Smith’s team enters a 
home without probable cause based on a hunch that Billy is captive 
inside. Suppose we stipulate that entering the home without normal 
cause was necessary to find Billy: had the police waited for a warrant, 
Billy would not have been rescued. Suppose we further stipulate that 
Billy’s case is sufficiently idiosyncratic that permitting the intrusion 
on cost-benefit grounds is unlikely to make the police significantly 
more likely to flout Fourth Amendment rules going forward.  
Measuring cost against benefit is still no easy task. If the question 
is framed as balancing (1) the harm of unwarranted entrance into the 
residence against (2) the benefit of rescuing Billy, the answer becomes 
self-evident: Billy should be rescued. But what if the question is 
framed, instead, as balancing (1) the harm of living in a world where 
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police intrude into homes without cause, whenever they have 
sufficiently strong hunches of wrongdoing, against (2) the benefits, in 
the aggregate, that such intrusions stand to yield?  
I am not saying the second question would necessarily come out 
differently than the first; that is an empirical question. The point, 
rather, is that although both questions aim at the same issue — does 
the harm of intrusion outweigh its benefits, or vice versa? — they 
invite two rather different inquiries. To ask the question in aggregated 
form is just different from asking it in isolated form. In aggregated 
form, the question prompts us to consider not only the harm wrought 
about by intrusion for each particular homeowner, but also the 
collective harm of living in a society where police are empowered to 
make judgment calls about when (and when not) to follow 
constitutional rules. That harm matters. Constitutional law is not 
simply about redressing one-off grievances. It is also about creating a 
world in which we go about our daily lives free from concern about 
unchecked government intrusion. The aggregation of privacy harms is 
crucial to that task. 
C. The Virtues of Stability 
The final tick in favor of categorical privacy rules is not specific to 
privacy law; it is a virtue of categorical decision-rules in general. 
Simply put, they promote stability. They allow us to plan our lives.16 
Thus far in this Part, I have been talking about what it would mean to 
let police argue around the probable cause standard and warrant 
requirement by pointing out the benefits of a specific intrusion. But 
the argument would also run the other way. On the same grounds that 
police could argue for a suspension of the warrant requirement, 
victims of intrusion could also presumably argue that adherence to 
the warrant requirement is insufficient to justify an intrusion. In other 
words, if the question centers on case-by-case CBA, there is no a 
priori reason to think that compliance with a categorical rule would 
always strike the correct balance. On the contrary, CBA is an 
appealing analytic tool precisely because categorical rules cannot be 
trusted, across cases, to strike the right balance. What is more, case 





16 See SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (developing a “planning” theory of law — i.e., 
describing law as a mechanism for allocating interpretive authority to different actors in 
predictable ways).   
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satisfied —Whren v. United States and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
perhaps most glaringly17 — but the costs of intrusion seem, to many 
observers, to significantly outstrip its benefits.  
Which raises the question: do we want a world in which probable 
cause (and other categorical rules) are demoted to the level of 
rebuttable presumptions? I think not. And especially not in areas like 
policing, where categorical rules, for better or worse, stabilize 
interactions between adversarial parties that would otherwise be 
prone to escalate. In this sense, categorical rules solve an important 
coordination problem.18 They negotiate boundaries in advance and, in 
doing so, provide actors on the ground with concrete heuristics to 
guide decision-making. Absent such heuristics, the police would either 
become too zealous — capitalizing on the latitude afforded by 
consequentialist exceptions to probable cause — or not zealous 
enough — fearing for potential challenges even when probable cause 
exists — or, somewhat paradoxically, both at once.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the coming decades, striking the proper balance between 
privacy and other values will be among the foremost challenges that 
judges, legislators, and regulators confront. In confronting it, they will 
have a choice to make: should the law preserve its categorical 
approach to privacy intrusions, or does the age of big data call for a 
more granular style of CBA?  
In this Essay, I sought to highlight the virtues of the categorical 
approach. Naturally, this is not to say that cost-benefit frameworks — 
like Kift and Nissenbaum’s — have no role to play in privacy law. But 
we should be clear about what that role is: to refine categorical 





17 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, due to the existence of probable cause, when the police 
arrested a woman for driving without a seatbelt and hauled her and her small children to 
the local precinct — an action that even the majority deemed “pointless”); Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that probable cause is sufficient to justify a search, 
even if the search was carried out for pretextual, including race-motivated, reasons). See 
also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (holding that an arrest was justified, due to 
the existence of probable cause to arrest for Crime X, despite the fact that the police 
understood themselves to be performing an arrest for Crime Y).  
18 For background on “coordination” as a concept from game theory, see Roger B. Myerson, 
Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 91 (2004).  
